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REPORT OF THE COMSTAC TASK GROUP ON
SOVIET ENTRY INTO THE WORLD SPACE MARKET
Robert D. Jones
Program Manager-Advanced Technology
Rocketdyne Division-Rockwell International
ABSTRACT
This paper is based on the evaluations of the special Task
Group of the Commercial Space Transportation Advisory
Committee as reported to the Department of Transportation.
The Task Group analyzed the impact of entry of former
Soviet Republics into world commercial space market and
provided policy recommendations to the Secretary of Trans
portation. The use of Soviet launch series by United States
origin satellites should not be allowed until enforceable, fair
rules are agreed to by the United States and the Common
wealth of Independent States.
INTRODUCTION
This paper is based on the evaluations by the special Task
Group of the Commercial Space Transportation Advisory
Committee (COMSTAC) as reported to the Department of
Transportation. The Task Group performed appropriate
investigations and provided draft recommendations for
consideration by the Commercial Space Transportation
Advisory Committee membership.
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PROCESS
The Task Group held biweekly meetings over a period of
several months. Interviews were conducted with individuals
from National Space Council, Office of US Trade Repre
sentative, Congressional Research Service, National Aero
nautics and Space Administration, Department of State,
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) marketing
representatives, and contractors who have recently visited
the CIS. The group also met with Dr. Roald Saghdeev, the
former director of the Institute for Space Research in
Moscow. The Office of Commercial Space Transportation
(OCST) authorized an on-site visit within CIS by one of
their support contractors, Berner, Lanphier and Associates,
who also provided data to the Task Group.
STATUS OF CIS PROGRAM

The charter of the Task Group was to—
• Compile the Soviet's space transportation products and
services being offered.
• Assess the marketability of these products and services.
• Evaluate the impact that market entry would have on the
domestic space transportation industry and include potential
opportunities as well as threats,
• Prepare National Space Policy recommendations to as
sure the future viability of the commercial space transpor
tation industry.

The military and civilian space programs of the former
Soviet Union were completely intertwined. At the peak,
1000 industrial and research organizations were involved,
employing over one million people. With the breakup of the
union, "ownership" of the various organizations trans
ferred to the republics in which they were located. About
80% of these are in Russia. With little central funding, each
factory and laboratory is independently seeking foreign
business.
Present US policy does not permit the export of our
satellites for launch from the Soviet Union. This policy is
based primarily on national security concerns. These con
cerns are greatly reduced now, and CIS leaders are urgently
requesting a change in our policy to allow them to earn hard
currency by providing launch services for Western satel
lites.

The Task Group had members from launch vehicle and
satellite industries to encourage a fair hearing on policy
recommendations from both perspectives. Membership of
the Task Group was as follows:
International Technology Underwrit
ers (INTEC)
General Dynamics Commercial
Launch Services
David Braverman Hughes Aircraft Company
Legal Consultant
Bill English
Space Systems/Loral
Rex Hollis

Rick Hauck

Lee Scherer

SPACE PRODUCTS AND SERVICES
The family of CIS vehicles is illustrated in Figure 1. The
Soviet Union consistently conducted more than four times as
many launches each year as did the United States.
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Figure 1. Former Soviet Union Launch Vehicles

payload for Zenit is also integrated horizontally and is
launched from Baikonur. A string of 14 successful launches
between April 1985 and May 1990 was followed by three
successive failures. In November 1992, the Zenit was
successfully launched, placing an early warning satellite
into orbit.

Medium and Large Launch Vehicles
The largest commercial launch service market today is
for medium and large communication satellites. Satellites in
this group weigh more than 3000 Ib to geosynchronous
transfer orbit. The US family of launch vehicles for this
market consists of Delta, Atlas, and Titan. The CIS
competitors in this class are the Proton and Zenit launch
systems. Their performance capabilities are shown in
Figure 2.

Small Launch Vehicles
The United States has the Scout, Conestoga, Taurus, and
the air-launched Pegasus in this weight class. The most
competitive CIS vehicles are the Kosmos and Tsyklon, as
well as modified weapons systems such as SS-18 and the
air-launched SS-24. The performance capabilities of these
vehicles are shown in Figure 3.

Proton has been operational for more than 25 years and
has flown more than 200 missions with a cumulative
reliability of about 88%. It has been used to boost payloads
to low Earth orbit, geosynchronous transfer orbit, and for
interplanetary missions. The Proton is designed at KB
Salyut and manufactured at the colocated Krunitschev
production plant in Russia. The vehicles are integrated with
the spacecraft horizontally and launched from Baikonur.
During the July visit to Krunitschev, the Proton reliability
was reported to be 97.5%, and more than 30 flights have
been successful since 1988.

Kosmos was first introduced in 1964. Its launch rate has
been 7 to 10 per year and nearly all launches are from
Plesetsk.
Tsyklon was first introduced in 1966. Its launch rate has
been 10 to 16 per year.
SS-18 is an intercontinental ballistic missile for which
CIS is seeking commercial uses.
SS-24 is a smaller weapon system which can be airlaunched from an AN-124 aircraft located anywhere in the
world. It is a direct competitor to the US Pegasus.
The first flight of SS-25 is scheduled for 1993.
Plans are in work to try commercialization of submarinelaunched missiles for suborbital microgravity missions.

Zenit was first introduced in 1985, it is one of the newest
of the CIS launch vehicles. One two-stage version (Zenit 2)
has flown to date. First flight of the three-stage version
(Zenit 3) is scheduled for 1993. The Zenit 3 is the version
competing for the medium and large communication satel
lite market. Zenit is produced at the Yuzhnoye factory in the
Ukraine, but its engines are manufactured in Russia. The
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Figure 2. Medium and Large Competitive Launch Vehicles
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Launch Sites
Within CIS, there are three launch sites as shown in
Figure 4:
• Kapusin Yar is primarily used for suborbital and sounding
rockets.
• Baikonur is equivalent to Cape Canaveral. It is a site for
all manned, geosynchronous, lunar, and interplanetary
launches. There are four Proton and two Zenit pads, but one
Zenit pad is reported to be damaged by a recent failure.
• Plesetsk is the CIS equivalent of Vandenberg Air Force
Base. Until recent years, this was a secret site used mainly
for military missions.
MARKETABILITY
Several factors determine the marketability of CIS launch
vehicles from the satellite owner's perspective. The princi
pal ones and an assessment of western customers' views of
these factors are as follows:
• Political and economic stability—Uncertain.
• Performance—Wide spectrum of choices.
• Compatibility—Probably feasible.
• Reliability—Generally equivalent to Western launchers.
• Licensing—US policy change required.
• Prices—Historically less than Western launchers.
• Schedule—Good with multiple pads and short interval
between launches.
• Facilities—Excellent, but require horizontal spacecraft
integration.
• Personnel accommodations—Acceptable.
• Contract authority and enforceability—Uncertain.

With the current political and economic situation, receipt
of hard currency has become of fundamental importance to
the CIS. There have been several reports of offerings of CIS
launch vehicles at prices well below those of Western
launchers. The launch price for a Proton, including space
craft integration, was quoted at $56 million in mid-1992.
The latest reports suggest that launch service prices will be
placed just enough below the perceived prices of Western
launchers to make the sale.
The maintenance of a reliable launch schedule in the face
of economic and political instability is a most volatile factor
influencing marketability. There is concern about the
instability and uncertainty in regulations and laws, the lack
of legal information and a reliable banking system, and the
general unpredictability in the commercial environment.
The stability of US policy must also be given prime
consideration.
The Market
The worldwide commercial launch vehicle supply al
ready exceeds commercial satellite demand, even without
the entrance of the CIS into the commercial market. Note
that in Figure 5 forecasted demand for medium and large
launch vehicles remains relatively constant throughout the
remainder of the decade while supply increases with the
introduction of the H-2 and Ariane 5 vehicles in the
mid-1990s. Obviously, entry of CIS vehicles into the
international market will exacerbate the fierce competition
already existing among the Western launchers: Ariane,
Delta, and Atlas.

Kazakhstan
Baikonur Cosmodr/Fhe (45.6 deg N)

Figure 4. Launch Sites of Former Soviet Union
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Figure 5. Medium to Heavy Commercial Satellite Market Forecast

Small vehicle launchers face a similar situation. Demand
is forecasted to increase sharply in the next several years,
but then remain at a constant level through the end of the
decade. Domestic supply alone is almost two times that of
the projected market.
CONCLUSIONS
There exists in the former Soviet Union a highly capable
and robust space transportation capability. If allowed to
offer launch services for the satellites for the world without
constraints, the CIS could completely dominate the market.
Today the CIS is a nonmarket economy. Prices for launch
services can be adjusted as necessary to ensure a sale,
Western launch providers would not be able to compete if a
level playing field is not enforced.
From a customer perspective, political stability within
CIS may be the overriding concern for some period of time.
Other major concerns relate to business matters: who has the
authority to sign a contract, insurance, legal aspects, and
general unpredictability in the commercial environment.
The number of satellites requiring commercial launch
services is estimated to be between 12 and 15 per year. He
launch services suppliers of today— the US companies and
Arianespace—have a capability of about 26 launches per
year, The supply will be increased with the entry of the
Japanese H-2 and the larger Ariane 5, both of which are
planned to enter the market about 1996. The launch services
supply by the end of the decade will be roughly twice the
demand without the entry of the CIS capabilities into the
market.
The commercial market for small satellites has not really
developed as yet. Since hundreds of ICBMs and thousands

of submarine-launched missiles will become surplus, this
market could be completely disrupted if these ex-weapons
systems are permitted to be used in this manner.
There are numerous opportunities for conducting busi^
ness ventures in the space arena of the former Soviet Union.
Given their desperate economic situation, it is concluded
that the number of good opportunities may be decreasing
with time.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The CIS must, with respect to its international customers,
agree to abide by certain special conditions designed to
avoid unfair conditions.
The use of CIS launch services by United States origin
satellites should not be allowed until such time as enforce
able fair rules are agreed to by the United States and CIS.
The US government should take an immediate, active
role to encourage and assist industry and government
agencies in the purchase of space-related CIS research and
technology (ideas, studies, personnel, and use of facilities).
The US launch industry should not be subjected to unfair
competition, particularly of the magnitude represented by
the CIS launcher capability. Pricing of CIS launch services
offered on the world market must be similar to those prices
prevailing in the international market for comparable com
mercial launch services. The advice of the launch and
satellite industries representatives should be solicited in
arriving at a pricing standard less subject to broad interpre
tation and more easily applied and enforced. A workable
regime is essential to ensure that the transition process
occurs in a measured manner.
Direct and indirect government support must be in accord
with practices (by governments and market economies)
prevailing in the international market.

4-23

No access to technology will be permitted except that
specifically authorized by the US government.
Effective means of enforcing all special conditions must
not only be established but rigorously applied.
International Maritime Satellite organization (INMAR
SAT) has submitted a request to be allowed to use Proton for
the launch of one of their INMARSAT III satellites.
Acceptance of this current proposal would establish a
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precedent difficult to contain as others make similar re
quests. Approval of such requests should await the negoti
ations of the transition trade agreement.
The US policy should direct that our surplus strategic
assets not destroyed but retained by the US government not
be used for any commercial purposes. The US should assure
that the CIS place the same restrictions on reuse of their
excess strategic missiles. If they refuse, appropriate trade
sanctions should be imposed.

